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Abstract
We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental
disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A
firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm’s invest-
ment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric information
call for public intervention to define rules aimed at increasing prevention. We
determine the investment in safety under No Liability, Strict Liability and Neg-
ligence, and compare it to the first best. Additionally, we investigate how the
(dis)ability of the firm to fully cover potential damages affects the firm’s behav-
ior. An experiment tests the theoretical predictions. In line with theory, Strict
Liability and Negligence are equally effective; both perform better than No Liabil-
ity; investment in safety is not sensitive to the ability of the firm to compensate
potential victims. In contrast with theory, prevention rates absent liability are
much higher and liability is much less effective than predicted.
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1 Introduction
We study the design of a suitable public policy for managing environmental dis-
asters. Beginning in the 1970s, there has been a major wave of health, safety and
environmental regulation. With the pioneering role of the United States, this led
to the establishment of new regulatory agencies with broad responsibilities for risk
and environmental policy, but also to Courts gaining importance (see Viscusi, 2007).
The rationale for this tendency is twofold. First, liability is often viewed as a success-
ful legal response to finance the remediation of hazardous sites or to indemnify the
victims (compensation role). Second, it may also foster incentives for prevention by
inducing private actors to internalize environmental damage (incentive role). Both
dimensions are valuable, in particular if one does not want to use public funds for
sites’ restoration, a common practice until now in Europe.
There exist various ways of attributing liability.1 The field of environmental risk
does not depart from more general contexts of accident law in its use of Strict Liabil-
ity and Negligence as the two main ways of holding (or not holding) the responsible
party liable for damages. A quick look at the main northern American or Euro-
pean laws reveals that these two liability rules are the most common regimes. For
instance, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), that was enacted in 1980 in the U.S.A., is a Strict Liability rule forcing
any responsible party to pay for the cleanup of contaminated sites. As for the Eu-
ropean Community, the 2004 Directive for contaminated sites is a Negligence rule.2
Despite the international tendency toward the introduction of liability regimes for
environmental damage, a general agreement on the rationale for relying on them is
still missing (see Faure and Skogh, 2003). In particular, it is widely accepted that
the insolvency of potential injurers is a serious impediment to the effectiveness of
1See Posner (1992) or Shavell (2004) for a textbook description of these liability rules.
2Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability regarding the prevention and compensation of environ-
mental damages, adopted by the European Parliament and Board of Ministers on April 21, 2004.
1
any liability rule.3 It is thus essential to understand the behavior of judgment-proof
firms (i.e. firms whose assets cannot fully cover potential damages) when subjected
to these policies.
In this paper we investigate which liability rule is most effective in reducing the
probability of an accident. Furthermore, we study the role of insolvency, i.e. whether
the firm’s willingness to invest in safety depends on the ability of the firm to com-
pensate third parties.4 More specifically, we compare the performance of No Liabil-
ity, Strict Liability, and Negligence rules enforced against firms that can potentially
harm third parties (i.e. the environment or human beings in their health or prop-
erty). In our analysis, we assume that the firm does not directly suffer damage
when an accident occurs. Only third parties, who do not have any contractual or
market relations with the firm, suffer harm. Employees of the firm and consumers
of the firm’s products are thus excluded from our analysis. Notice that we restrict
attention to unilateral accidents: while firms (potential injurers) have influence on
the probability of occurrence of the harm, third parties (potential victims) play a
passive role (i.e. they have no means to affect the probability and the size of the
damage).5
The focus of our decision model is a potential disaster due to the firm’s moral hazard
when investing in prevention. With a small probability, the firm can cause a huge
damage to third parties. However, the firm can reduce the likelihood of accidents
3Other limits are the low probability of a suit, the difficulty of proving causality between the de-
cisions of injurers and harm and/or the long time it takes, scientific ignorance, the uncertainty about
judgments by Courts due to mistakes and the subjectiveness of judges (Shavell, 1984b). Further-
more, liability may change the contractual or market relationships in risky sectors which may lead to
under-investment there (Hiriart and Martimort, 2006b). On the other hand, liability is a very natural
way to align private with public interests. Therefore there is a strong tendency to introduce liability
as a part of traditional regulation all over the world.
4Since we are talking about the firm and third parties, the reader may ask who the second party
is. The second party is public authorities.
5See Shavell (2004) for unilateral accidents in the Law and Economics literature.
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by investing in safety measures. The firm’s safety care involves, e.g., buying new
equipment, educating and training employees, increasing watchfulness. In addi-
tion, safety measures taken by the firm are not directly observable by the authorities.
Since prevention is both costly to the firm and unobservable by the rest of the world,
we model safety care as a moral hazard variable. The potential externality caused
by a disaster together with asymmetric information require authorities to provide
incentives for the firm to reduce risk. Public intervention takes the form of liability
rules. They induce the firm to reduce risk and/or to compensate the victim in case
of damage. We assume that if an accident occurs, victims lose their entire wealth.
The injurer’s assets, however, may not suffice to fully compensate victims. Since the
firm is protected by limited liability, the firm can only be held liable for damages up
to the value of her6 wealth, but not beyond.
In our theoretical model, we determine the conditions leading the firm to invest in
prevention under No Liability, Strict Liability and Negligence and compare these con-
ditions to the first-best. An experiment allows to test the main theoretical insights.
Our experimental results show that in line with theory, both Strict Liability and Neg-
ligence perform better than No Liability: the firm increases her level of safety care
under these rules. Further, there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of
Strict Liability and Negligence, confirming another theoretical result. Last, investment
in safety does not change when the firm is unable to cover losses of third parties. In
contrast with theory, prevention rates absent liability are much higher and liability
is much less effective than predicted.
This paper belongs to the Law and Economics literature devoted to tort law, more
precisely to the public control of agents that can potentially and unintentionally
harm third parties. We investigate the incentives provided by public authorities to
foster prevention when safety care is unobservable. In this sense, this paper can be
6Although grammatically incorrect, when talking about the firm we will use the pronouns “her”
and “she” in order to be consistent with the literature.
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related to the Principal-Agent literature.7 At the same time, our paper differs from
this literature because the set of instruments available to public authorities (the Prin-
cipal here) to control agents is restricted to the definition of liability rules. More in
line with the Law and Economics literature, there is no direct and personalized regu-
lation here (taking the form of a regulatory contract, for instance). Liability rules are
common knowledge and apply equally to all agents. The theoretical model of this
paper is related both to Shavell (1980), and Shavell (1986). Shavell (1980) analyzes
thoroughly Strict Liability versus Negligence rules, while Shavell (1986) provides in-
sights on the judgment-proof problem.
The original part of our work remains the empirical one. The empirical literature
on environmental liability rules is considered small. The few econometric studies
that exist are, e.g., on the adoption of Strict Liability within the U.S.A. (Alberini and
Austin, 1997), the effectiveness of Strict Liability when handling toxic spills (Alberini
and Austin, 1998), on how firms escape Strict Liability (Alberini and Austin, 1999,
2001), etc. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that compares the relative
performance of liability rules. We aim to fill this gap. Since the variable of interest,
i.e. investment in safety, is not observable in the field, we had to make use of the
experimental method.
Also, there are not many experiments on liability rules. King and Schwartz (1999,
2000) and Dopuch and King (1992) study the special case of liability rules for audi-
tors. Dopuch, Ingberman and King (1997) explore liability rules applied to the multi-
defendant case, namely proportionate versus joint and several liability rules. Wittman
et al. (1997) investigate the learning of liability rules. The experimental study which
is most similar to ours is by Kornhauser and Schotter (1990). The main difference
between our framework and theirs is that we consider accidents of substantial size
compared to the injurer’s level of assets. Disasters pose a particular problem for
7See Pitchford (1995), Newman and Wright (1990), or Hiriart and Martimort (2006a), although all
these papers study essentially the case of extended liability.
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public authorities due to the frequent insolvency of the responsible parties. Our
main contribution is to shed light on the level of prevention when potential injurers
cannot fully compensate victims. This is a question that, to our knowledge, has not
been the object of experiments yet. Further three important design issues contrast
our study with Kornhauser and Schotter (1990). First, in our experiment there is a
real third party, i.e. a subject who is sitting in the laboratory and can potentially
suffer losses resulting from the behavior of the injurer. In Kornhauser and Schotter
(1990), if an accident occurs, the injurer is called upon to pay for the damage but
no one gets “hurt”. Second, subjects in our experiment earn their endowment in a
real effort task. This way they are induced to perceive the money at risk as their
own, which makes the decision situation more realistic and may lead to a different
behavior compared to the case where the money at risk is provided as a windfall
by the experimenter. Third, Kornhauser and Schotter (1990) lack a No liability treat-
ment, for which we find rather intriguing results. Given these differences in the
experimental designs, it is not surprising that also the results differ. While we find
evidence in favor of the equivalence between Strict Liability and Negligence, Korn-
hauser and Schotter (1990) do not find such equivalence, even when the standard of
due care is set at the optimal level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The experimental
design, procedures, and behavioral predictions are described in Section 3. Results
are given in Section 4. Section 5 briefly concludes by pointing out alleys for further
work.
2 The Model
A firm can cause a damage of a given size h to third parties (human beings and/or
the environment). The firm can exercise some safety care e ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. invest in
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safety, in order to reduce the probability of accident from p0 to p1 (both being in
[0, 1]), with ∆p = p0 − p1 > 0. The firm has assets w0 to start with. Let us denote by
wt the assets at time t. It costs an amount c > 0 to the firm to invest in safety (e = 1),
whereas not investing in safety (e = 0) costs nothing. This level of investment in
safety is privately known by the firm: it is neither observable by public authorities,
nor by third parties.8
In each period t, the firm faces the same decision problem: to invest in safety or
not. Each unit invested in safety decreases the firm’s remaining wealth by the same
amount. The intertemporal dimension is reduced to nothing because there is no
binding constraint in the problem the firm solves in each period: the firm’s wealth
is by large greater than the total amount she may invest in safety, even if she would
invest in safety in each period. The investment decision in each period is thus com-
pletely independent from the investment decision in the other periods. The frame-
work boils down to a static decision model, which is repeated a finite number of
times.
When an accident takes place, the firm is held liable or not to pay for the harm
caused, depending on the liability rule.
In the absence of liability, i.e. No Liability (henceforth NoL) rule, the firm does not
pay anything, and the third party bears the losses.
Under a Strict Liability (henceforth SL) rule, the firm responsible for the harm caused
to a third party must compensate the third party, independently of the firm’s behav-
ior in the conduct of the operations that have led to the damage, i.e. even if the firm
has been cautious and the damage could not have been avoided by the exercise of
due care.9
Under a Negligence (henceforth Ne) rule, the firm is not held liable for the harm
8This model is an adaptation of Shavell (1984a).
9See Shavell (2004).
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caused, unless she is found negligent, i.e. unless the firm has not satisfied a standard
of due care in the conduct of the operations that have led to the damage.10 Here the
standard of due care is set at e = 1.
 Social optimum. Investing in safety is socially optimal if the expected social cost
of investing is smaller than the expected social cost of not investing:
p1 ∗ h+ c ≤ p0 ∗ h.
This condition can be rewritten as
c ≤ ∆p ∗ h. (1)
The high level of safety care is thus socially optimal when the prevention cost borne
by the firm is smaller than the incremental expected harm affecting third parties.
Let us assume that this inequality holds in what follows: the objective of public
authorities is then to implement this high level of care. Since investment in safety
is unobservable, the best authorities can do is to impose policies so as to induce the
firm to exercise e = 1. This is the role assigned to liability rules. We will first assess
their efficiency from a theoretical viewpoint before testing it with an experiment. To
this end, we characterize the circumstances under which the firm invests in safety
care: if a liability rule induces the firm to exercise e = 1 in any circumstances, then
the rule is socially efficient.
We now have to characterize the firm’s cost-minimizing choice under each liability
rule. Whatever the rule, the firm invests in safety if the expected private cost of
investing is smaller than the expected private cost of not investing.
 Under NoL rule, the firm invests in safety care if
p1 ∗ 0 + (1− p1) ∗ 0 + c ≤ p0 ∗ 0 + (1− p0) ∗ 0,
10An injurer firm is held liable for losses if her level of care is less than a level called due care that
the Courts specify. See Posner (1992).
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which never holds true since c > 0. Hence, the firm is never induced to exercise
e = 1: NoL rule is always inefficient.
 Under SL rule, a responsible firm with assets wt at time t has to pay an amount
equal to min{h,wt} since the firm is protected by limited liability. The firm thus
invests at time t if
p1 ∗min{h,wt}+ (1− p1) ∗ 0 + c ≤ p0 ∗min{h,wt}+ (1− p0) ∗ 0,
which can be rewritten as
c ≤ ∆p ∗min{h,wt}. (2)
Comparing (2) to (1), it is clear that a SL regime will induce the proper investment in
safety (or choice of care) when the firm is rich enough. The firm will always invest
in safety when her assets are sufficient to cover the external harm, i.e. when wt ≥ h.
In this favorable case, the firm exercises e = 1 and, if an accident occurs, the firm
is able to (and will) fully compensate the third party for losses. The firm will also
invest when her assets fall in a medium range, i.e. when wt ∈
[
c
∆p
, h
)
: SL creates
enough incentives to take care, although the firm will compensate the third party
only partially. Conversely, when the firm’s assets fall below the threshold c
∆p
, the
firm will not take care. In this case SL regime is inefficient and the compensation
provided by the firm to the harmed third party will be lower than in the medium
range case.
 Under Ne rule, the firm is held liable only if she did not exercise e = 1. Hence, the
firm invests in safety if
p1 ∗ 0 + (1− p1) ∗ 0 + c ≤ p0 ∗min{h,wt}+ (1− p0) ∗ 0,
which can be rewritten as
c ≤ p0 ∗min{h,wt}. (3)
Comparing (3) to (2), it is clear that Ne rule will induce the firm to take care more
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often than SL rule: (3) is less demanding than (2), since p0 ≥ ∆p.11 Again, three
intervals of the firm’s wealth can be defined according to the efficiency of the rule
and to the extent of the compensation. When wt ≥ h, the firm takes care and pays
h if damage occurs. In a medium range of wealth where wt ∈
[
c
p0
, h
)
, the firm
takes care but compensates only partially the third party if an accident occurs. Last,
when the firm’s wealth is below the threshold c
p0
, the firm does not take care and
can compensate the third party even less for the harm caused.
The results above hold for risk neutral firms. The analysis for risk averse firms
using a CARA utility function is provided in Appendix A. Under risk aversion,
the conditions for which the firm chooses to invest in safety under each liability
regime are slightly different but the qualitative results obtained under risk neutrality
remain the same. Namely, the firm should not invest in safety under NoL but should
do so under SL or Ne, provided that both the prevention cost and the degree of risk
aversion are not too large. Ne induces prevention for a larger set of parameters than
SL.
3 Experiment
3.1 Design
We implemented six distinct treatments (see Table 1). They differed in the type of
liability rule (NoL, SL, or Ne) and in whether the harm potentially caused could be
fully compensated by the injurer. In the low (high) damage treatments, the potential
injurer would always (never) be able to fully compensate the potential victim.
The experiment consisted of two phases with 5 periods each. Phase 2 was merely a
11This means that the firm’s choice e = 1 will be induced by Ne rule for a larger set of parameters,
i.e. also for wt ∈
[
c
p0
, c∆p
)
.
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low damage high damage
No Liability (NoL) NoL-low NoL-high
Strict Liability (SL) SL-low SL-high
Negligence (Ne) Ne-low Ne-high
Table 1: Treatments
repetition of phase 1. One of the phases was randomly selected for payment at the
end of the experiment. We opted for a repeated set-up with a restart (i.e. phase 2)
to check whether decisions of experienced subjects differed from those of inexperi-
enced ones. This offers a control for learning. At the same time phases were chosen
not too long in order to avoid noise in the decisions caused by boredom and fatigue.
The 30 participants were randomly assigned to roles (A and B) and A-B-pairs at
the beginning of each phase.12 One can think of subject A as the firm or potential
injurer and of subject B as the third party, or potential victim.13 Just like in the
model, the third party was passive in all treatments of the experiment: B was going
to be affected by the decisions of A, but could not do anything to influence them.
Since there was no interaction between A and B, subjects in the experiment faced
an individual decision making situation in a non-strategic set-up. In addition, the
investment decision remained private information to A: no other participants could
observe it.
Subjects were not informed until the end of the phase about their role, so that first
everyone was asked to decide as if they had been assigned the role of A. This way we
collected 30 individual decision paths as A for each phase and each treatment.14 At
12Phase 1 was independent from phase 2 in both the random draw of roles, and the random as-
signment to pairs.
13To keep a neutral frame, we never used the terms “injurer” and “victim” in the instructions.
14This procedure is known as random dictatorship. It allowed us to collect data on twice as many
subjects because this way also subjects who were assigned the role of B and would otherwise have
been passive, were asked to make decisions.
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the end of each phase, subjects were informed about their actual role. The decision
path of the subject who had been assigned the role of A became relevant for the
payoff outcome of the A-B pair. In contrast, the decision path of B became irrelevant
for the payoff outcome of the same A-B pair.
In each of the five periods, with a probability of 5%, an accident15 would occur and
lead to a loss of endowment to A, B, or both, depending on the treatment. In each
period, subject A was asked to decide whether she wanted to reduce this probability
to 1% by investing 1 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). An endowment of 40 ECU
was given to subject A at the beginning of each phase. Subject B’s endowment de-
pended on the treatment: it was 30 ECU in the low damage treatments and 50 ECU
in the high damage treatments. When an accident occurred, the victim lost her en-
tire wealth. In the low damage treatments, A was able to fully compensate B in every
period t of the phase independently of A’s investment in prevention. Conversely, in
the high damage treatments, A was never able to fully compensate B.
In each period, each subject first made her decision and then learned whether she
was hit by an accident. Subjects also learned how many other subjects were hit. This
information was restricted to the “the subject’s feedback group”, i.e. to 14 other sub-
jects with whom the subject in question had not been paired for sure.16 We opted for
general feedback about accidents in order to add more realism to the experiment. In
reality information about major environmental disasters is usually provided in the
form of statistics in the news and may lead to a change in the behavior of potential
injurers.
Whenever a subject was hit by an accident, that subject was not allowed to make
decisions in the remaining periods of the current phase.17
15Instead of an “accident” we spoke of an “event” in the instructions to keep a neutral frame.
16Recall that until the end of the phase subjects did not know their role in the pair. Therefore,
receiving information about an accident occurring to a subject potentially paired with oneself would
unnaturally influence one’s decision path.
17An accident introduces an asymmetry in the decision situation. Before the accident, A holds her
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At the end of the phase, subjects were informed about their actual role, whether
their pair was hit by an accident and the resulting payoffs. If the pair was not hit by
an accident, A’s payoff was her initial endowment less her total prevention cost (the
ECU paid for investment in safety in the five periods of the phase). B simply kept
her initial endowment. In the case of accident, payoffs depended on the treatment.
First, B lost her initial endowment (30 ECU in the low damage treatments and 50
ECU in the high damage treatments). Then,
• in the NoL treatments, A was not required to compensate B. Therefore, A’s
payoff amounted to her initial endowment less her total prevention cost, inde-
pendently of B’s initial endowment. B was left with nothing.
• in the SL treatments, A was required to compensate B up to the level of A’s
remaining wealth, independently of whether A had invested in safety in that
period or not.18 In treatment SL-low, B received 30 ECU from A. A was left with
a positive amount of money: 40 ECU less the 30 ECU compensation less the
total prevention cost (at most 5 ECU). In the SL-high treatment, B received from
A 40 ECU less A’s total prevention cost (i.e., at most 40, which is 10 less than
what B initially possessed). A was left with nothing since her entire wealth
was transferred to B.
• in the Ne treatments, payoffs were conditional on A’s decision in the period of
the accident. If A had invested in safety in the period of the accident, A was
not required to compensate B: by investing 1 ECU, A had complied with the
standard of due care and was not liable for the harm caused. Hence, payoffs
were exactly as in the NoL treatments. If A had not invested in safety in the
endowment less the cost for investment in safety. After the accident, depending on the liability rule,
A may not have any more resources to invest in safety, even if she wants to.
18Since A was protected by limited liability, A was not supposed to give to B more than what A
owned.
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period of the accident, A was required to compensate B up to the level of A’s
wealth. The resulting payoffs were, therefore, the same as in the SL treatments.
The last task was a post-experimental questionnaire consisting of three questions.
Questions aimed at collecting information about the risk attitudes19 of subjects and
their perceptions of others’ and own selfishness. The translation from German read:
1. “How do you judge yourself: are you generally a risk loving person, or do you
try to avoid risks?”; 2. Would you say that most of the time people try to help others
or only follow their own interests? 3. Would you say that most of the time you try
to help others or only follow your own interests?. The answer to 1. was on a scale
from zero (not risk loving at all) to ten (very risk loving). Answers to 2. and 3. were
on a scale from 0 (help others) to 6 (follow own interests).
At the end of the experiment, payoffs were converted from ECU into euros at the
exchange rate of 6 ECU = 1 euro. A show-up fee of 2.5 euros was added to that
amount and paid to subjects in cash.
3.2 Procedures
We performed one session per treatment, i.e. six sessions altogether. A total number
of 192 undergraduate students from the University of Jena (32 per session) partici-
pated in this experiment. They were recruited with the online recruitment system
for economic experiments ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Additional 64 subjects took part
in the two pilot sessions. On average, participants earned 8.65 euros and spent 60
minutes (15 minutes of which on the instructive part) in the laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute of Economics in Jena (Germany).
Upon arrival in the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle with
19Asking this question is a simple procedure to estimate risk attitudes of subjects. It is shown to be
as effective as other common and much more complicated procedures (see Dohmen et al., 2005).
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a computer. First, subjects received only instructions for Part I of the experiment,
explaining a real effort task they had to perform in order to earn their initial endow-
ment for Part II. Earning the initial endowment was equivalent to earning the right
to participate in Part II or the main experiment. Subjects were given five minutes
time to solve as many as possible mathematical tasks of summing up five two-digit
numbers (as in Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). At the end of the real effort task sub-
jects were ranked according to the number of math tasks they had solved correctly.
The 30 best performers received their initial endowment and the second part of the
instructions.20 The two worst performers did not earn an endowment and had to
leave the laboratory. They were compensated with 3 euros each. The purpose of the
real effort task was to make subjects earn their endowment and hence perceive the
money at risk as their own or as that of the potential victim.
For both parts of the experiment, after subjects read the instructions individually,
instructions were also read aloud by the experimenter. The experimenter clarified
the instructions in private, when necessary. Additionally, before Part II of the ex-
periment began, subjects answered a list of questions checking their understanding
of the instructions. Part II did not start before everyone had answered all questions
correctly. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
In Part II of the experiment, the realization sequences for accident/no accident for
each of the two probabilities 1% and 5%, and for each subject were drawn in ad-
vance. Each subject within a treatment faced an independent sequence of realiza-
tions. In order to ensure the comparability of treatments, subjects with the same
identification number in different treatments (e.g. subjects with number 1 in all
treatments) were confronted with the same sequence of realizations. To help sub-
jects calculate the probability to be hit by an accident in one of the remaining peri-
ods of the current phase, we supplied them with an on-screen calculator.21 In this
20See Appendix B for an English translation of the instructions.
21See Instructions in Appendix B for a picture of it.
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calculator subjects could enter their planned decisions until the end of the phase.
The calculator would then compute the probability for an accident to occur and the
complementary probability for an accident not to occur until the end of the phase.
By showing both probabilities we made sure that we did not influence subjects in an
optimistic or pessimistic way. The calculator was accessible to subjects at all times.
During the experiment, eye contact was not possible. Although participants saw
each other at the entrance of the lab, there was no way for them to guess with which
person(s) from the crowd of 30 students they would be matched in the two phases
of Part II of the experiment. Most subjects were experienced – only 10 out of 256 had
never participated in an experiment before.
3.3 Behavioral predictions
In this section, we derive hypotheses based on the theoretical model from Section 2,
its extension for risk aversion (in Appendix A), and the following parameter values:
c = 1, p0 = 0.05, p1 = 0.01 (hence ∆p = 0.04), h = {30, 50}, and wt ∈ [35, 40].
It is straightforward to see that (1) is satisfied for both harm sizes. Hence, investment
in safety (i.e. e = 1) is socially optimal.
What should the decision of a subject be under each liability rule? Subjects should
not invest in safety under the NoL rule,22 but should do so both under the SL rule23
22In both treatments NoL-high and NoL-low, the subject pays 1 ECU if she invests in safety and
nothing if she does not invest. The occurrence of an accident does not lead to any cost for this
subject. Hence, the subject should not invest whatever her attitude towards risk.
23In treatment SL-low, min{h,wt} = h = 30; c = 1 is smaller than 0.04 ∗ 30 = 1.2. In treatment
SL-high, min{h,wt} = wt; c = 1 is smaller than (0.04 ∗ wt) ∈ [1.4; 1.6]. Condition (2) is thus satisfied
in all SL treatments, meaning that a risk neutral subject should invest in safety in each period. From
Appendix A, it is easy to see that the same result holds for risk averse subjects, when their degree of
risk aversion is not so extreme.
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and the Ne rule.24
In accordance with the model and the chosen parameter values, the potential injurer
should invest in safety in the presence of liability rules; the corollary is that the
potential injurer should not invest in safety in the absence of any liability rule. If this
result holds at the individual level, it should also hold when considering a group
of individuals faced with the same decision task, without any strategic interaction
among them. This leads us to the following hypotheses:
H1. On average, investment in safety under SL and Ne will be above investment in safety
under NoL.
H2. On average, investment in safety under Ne should not differ from investment in safety
under SL.
In her desire to reduce the probability of an accident, the potential injurer should
be driven by her own loss (the amount the injurer will be asked to pay as a com-
pensation for the harm caused to third parties), but not directly by the loss borne by
third parties. In particular, in the model the potential injurer is protected by limited
liability. Hence, in her investment decision, she should never take into account the
losses that exceed her own liabilities, i.e. the losses that she is unable to compensate:
H3. For a given liability regime, whether the potential damage can be fully compensated or
not will not influence investment in safety.
24In treatment Ne-low, min{h,wt} = h = 30; c = 1 is smaller than p0 ∗ 30 = 1.5. In treatment
Ne-high, min{h,wt} = wt; c = 1 is smaller than (p0 ∗ wt) ∈ [1.75; 2]. Condition (3) is thus satisfied
in all Ne treatments, meaning that a risk neutral subject should invest in safety in each period. From
Appendix A, it is easy to see that the same result holds for risk averse subjects, for any degree of risk
aversion.
16
4 Results
In analyzing the results we will proceed as follows. In the subsection “Main results”
we will (i) compare investment in safety under the three liability rules, and (ii) check
whether the ability to fully compensate the victim influences investment in safety.
In the subsection “Controls”, we will look at how additional factors – like individ-
ual perception of risk, of own and general selfishness, and learning from own and
others’ experience – influence the decision to invest in safety.
4.1 Main results
Table 2 shows the distribution of the variable investment in safety (INVEST). Remem-
ber that for each liability rule we ran two sessions (60 subjects in total) – one in which
the victim could be fully compensated for a potential damage and one for which she
could not. In this table we pooled the data within each liability rule. Thus, for the
time being we neglect the influence of the ability to compensate the victim. This is
done to assess only the influence of the liability rule on investment behavior.
Treatment NoL SL Ne
Number of INVEST decisions 296 391 416
Total number of decisions 570 584 588
% of INVEST decisions 0.52 0.67 0.71
Table 2: Investment in safety decisions by treatment, pooled.
Note: The number of missing decisions due to accidents was 30 in NoL, 16 in SL, 12 in Ne.
Investment in safety is highest under Ne, followed by SL, and NoL. To assess whether
these differences are significant, we compared pairwise the three distributions using
a χ2–test. Investment in safety is significantly lower under NoL than under Ne (p =
0.000) and SL (p = 0.000). The small difference between investment in safety under
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SL and Ne is not statistically significant (p = 0.279).
Figure 1 shows the proportion of investment in safety decisions over time. Notice
that learning (within a phase and between the two phases) neither causes an in-
crease in investment in safety, nor a decrease. Further below we confirm this visual
observation with several regressions.
Figure 1: Investment in safety decisions over time (in %), by liability rule (pooled
for ability to compensate the victim)
We summarize our results so far as follows:
Result 1 : Investment in safety in the presence of liability rules is always above investment
in safety in the absence of liability rules.
Result 2 : Investment in safety under the Ne rule does not significantly differ from invest-
ment in safety under the SL rule.
Our findings differ from Kornhauser and Schotter (1990) who observe that SL and
Ne are not equivalent, even when the standard of due care is set at the socially opti-
mal level.25 Under Ne, they find compliance to the standard of due care (when set at
25The standard of due care is also set at its optimal level e = 1 in our experiment, so the difference
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its optimal level or not too far above), with remarkably stable investment in safety
behavior over 35 periods. Under SL however, behavior in their experiment is quite
volatile, showing over-investment in the first periods and under-investment in the
final periods. We observe rule equivalence and stable investment in safety under
both rules.
Next, we shed light on how being able to compensate victims’ losses affects invest-
ment in safety. Table 3 presents investment by treatment.
Treatment NoL-low NoL-high SL-low SL-high Ne-low Ne-high
Number of INVEST decisions 140 156 202 189 205 211
Total number of decisions 287 283 292 292 293 295
% of INVEST decisions 0.49 0.55 0.69 0.65 0.70 0.72
Table 3: Investment in safety by treatment
Note: The number of missing decisions due to accidents was 13 in NoL-low, 17 in NoL-high,
8 in each of the two SL treatments, 7 in Ne-low, and 5 in Ne-high.
To assess whether being able to fully compensate the victim influences investment
in safety, we compare treatments where the victim can be compensated with treat-
ments where she cannot be compensated, keeping the liability rule the same. So,
using a χ2–test, we check whether the distribution of the investment in safety vari-
able is the same for SL-low and SL-high, and for Ne-low and Ne-high. These pairwise
comparisons of treatments do not yield any significant differences. This is also con-
firmed by our regressions further below.
Result 3 : Investment in safety in the presence of liability rules is not sensitive to the size
of the potential damage.
Keeping the size of the damage the same while pairwise comparing liability rules
in results cannot come from this specification. It should be noticed that we have adopted a binary
level of care whereas Kornhauser and Schotter (1990) modeled care as a “continuous” variable.
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confirms Results 1 and 2: liability significantly increases prevention, and SL and Ne
are equally effective.26
Fig. 2 depicts proportions of investment decisions by treatment over time.
Figure 2: Investment in safety decisions over time (in %), by treatment
Keeping the liability rule the same and comparing the size of the damage phase
by phase yields significant results only for the NoL treatments. In phase 2 of the
experiment, investment in safety under NoL-high is significantly above investment
in safety under NoL-low (χ2–test, p = 0.044). Thus, only subjects experienced with
phase 1 are sensitive to the potential damage caused to third parties and only in the
absence of liability rules. It seems that this (second-phase) sensitivity to damage is
crowded out by liability.
Generally, it is quite striking that investment in safety under NoL (around 50%) is
larger than the increase in prevention achieved with the introduction of liability
rules (around 20%). Moreover, although liability increases prevention significantly,
prevention never reaches 100%. One reason for the last observation may be that our
theoretical prediction of 100% prevention under liability relies on the assumption
26Investment in safety under NoL-low is significantly below investment in safety under both SL-low
and Ne-low, with both p = 0.000. The same is true when comparing NoL-high to SL-high, and NoL-high
to Ne-high with p = 0.012 and p = 0.000, respectively.
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that agents are risk neutral or risk averse.27 Therefore, this result may be due to
the presence of a significant percentage of risk loving subjects in our pool. To check
this conjecture, we separated risk averse and risk neutral subjects from risk loving
subjects. Table 4 shows that the average investment in safety grows when we take
out the risk loving subjects (compare the last row of Table 3 to the second column
of Table 4). However, also for the group of risk averse and risk neutral subjects
only, investment in safety remains considerably below 100% (for a detailed version
of Table 4, see Table 6 in Appendix C).
Treatment Risk averse & neutral subjects Risk loving subjects
NoL-low 0.70 0.30
NoL-high 0.62 0.43
SL-low 0.77 0.46
SL-high 0.70 0.50
Ne-low 0.86 0.48
Ne-high 0.80 0.43
Table 4: Investment in safety by risk attitude
Note: risk averse and risk neutral subject are those who reported a score lower or
equal to 5 in the post experimental questionnaire; risk-loving subjects are those
who reported a score greater than 5.
Result 4 : The rate of prevention without liability is unexpectedly high. The rate of preven-
tion with liability is unexpectedly low. The rate of prevention in the absence of liability rules
27In Appendix A we show that under Strict Liability a risk-averse subject should invest in safety
only for r ∈ {0, 9.65}, i.e. if she is not extremely risk averse. However, subjects with a constant abso-
lute risk aversion r greater than 9.65 are very rare in the real world. For them, predictions for risky
choices with higher payoffs would be absurd (see, e.g., Binswanger, 1980, 1981). For instance, such
subjects would prefer a sure amount of 1 euro to a lottery giving them 1000 euros with probability
0.99 and 0 euro otherwise.
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is higher than the increase in prevention achieved with the introduction of liability rules.
4.2 Controls for individual characteristics and learning
In this section we present evidence on whether and how additional factors, like
individual characteristics and learning affect investment in safety.
Although our theoretical model assumes risk neutrality, decision makers may not be
risk neutral.28 The majority of our subjects exhibit risk aversion when asked about
their attitude towards risk at the end of the experiment. In fact, the median reported
risk attitude in our experiment is 4 – on a scale from 0 (risk averse) to 10 (risk loving)
– which is significantly less than the risk neutral value of 5 (one sample median
test). Also, subjects may have a preference for helping others that can interfere with
liability rules. Further, subjects may learn. Learning may be due to subjects getting
used to the decision situation and also to own experience (e.g. having been hit by
an accident in phase 1) and feedback about the experience of others (accidents in
the ‘feedback group’). In the regressions in Table 5 we control for these additional
factors to show that the increase in investment in safety with respect to treatments
NoL is indeed due to liability rules.
The variables that enter the regressions in Table 5 can be grouped into treatment
28We acknowledge that the risk attitude of an individual cannot directly be translated as the risk
attitude of a company. It is debatable whether firms are risk averse, like individuals, or not. The
attitude towards risk of companies is certainly related to their size and to their financial constraints.
The framework of our experiment is by far too simple to take into account such parameters. To
sustain the argument that firms are not necessarily risk neutral and that the resulting decisions can
look like the ones of individuals, we refer to Leland and Pyle (1977). These authors show that the
assumption of risk aversion has some meaning for small companies that suffer from restricted access
to financial markets. However, in order to convince investors that their project is worthwhile, these
risk averse small firms accept to bear some risk and, finally, seem to behave like risk neutral big
companies.
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Dep.var.: INVEST Ia Ib Ic IIa IIb
NoL dummy .69***(.13) .69***(.14) .84***(.15) .74***(.14) .74***(.15)
SL dummy .86***(.12) .86***(.13) .75***(.13) .88***(.14) .88***(.14)
Ne dummy .93***(.12) .93***(.13) .80***(.14) .98***(.14) .98***(.14)
High damage dummy – –.00(.07) .01(.06) – –.01(.07)
Risk attitude –.08***(.01) –.08***(.01) –.08***(.01) –.09***(.01) –.09***(.01)
Others–selfish –.06**(.03) –.06**(.03) –.06**(.03) –.07**(.03) –.07**(.03)
Me–selfish –.02(.03) –.02(.03) .02(.03) –.01(.03) –.01(.03)
Me–selfish * NoL dummy – – -.12**(.05) – –
Phase 2 dummy –.03(.10) –.03(.10) –.03(.10) – –
Phase 1 dummy * Period –.00(.01) –.00(.01) –.00(.01) – –
Phase 2 dummy * Period .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) –.00(.01) –.00(.01)
N. of accidents in t− 1 –.03(.02) –.03(.02) –.03(.02) .00(.03) .00(.03)
Accident in phase 1 dummy – – – -.12(.14) -.12(.14)
N of observations 1549 1549 1549 856 856
Table 5: Marginal effects from logit regressions explaining investment in safety. Ran-
dom effects at the individual level control for the fact that individuals decide repeat-
edly. Standard errors (computed with the delta method) in parentheses, *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Regressions Ia, Ib, Ic use the whole data set. Regressions IIa,
IIb use data from phase 2 only.
variables (the first four), individual characteristics (the next four), and learning (the
last five). Now, we will describe them in detail. The data from NoL-low and NoL-high
are pooled under the NoL dummy. The same applies to the SL dummy and the Ne
dummy. This is done to measure the effect of the type of liability rule only. By con-
struction, these dummies ignore the size of the damage. Therefore, we introduced
the High damage dummy to measure the effect of the size of the damage, indepen-
dently of the liability rule. It takes the value of 1 for NoL-high, SL-high, and Ne-high,
and 0 otherwise. While regressions a only measure the effect of liability rules, regres-
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sions b also measure the effect of insolvency (i.e. the size of the damage caused to
third parties). The next three variables were elicited in the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire: Risk attitude on a scale from 0 (very risk averse) to 10 (very risk loving),
Others-selfish29 and Me-selfish30 on a scale from 0 (help others) to 6 (follow own in-
terests). The interaction Me–selfish * NoL dummy shows how the opinion of subjects
about being selfish or pro-social influences their behavior in treatment NoL only.
Regression Ic differs from Ib only in this variable. Phase 2 dummy takes the value of
1 for phase 1 and 0 for phase 2. It accounts for learning from phase 1 to phase 2.
The interaction between the Phase dummies and Period (going from 1 to 5) accounts
for learning within each phase.31 N. of accidents in t − 1 is the number of accidents
that occurred in the subject’s feedback group in the previous period. Here we as-
sume that accidents from at most the previous period may affect decisions in the
current period. Accident in phase 1 dummy takes the value 1 if a subjects was hit by
an accident in phase 1.32
We run logit regressions (since the dependent variable investment in safety or IN-
VEST is binary) and report marginal effects. Because individuals make decisions re-
29Recall that the question was “Would you say that most of the time people try to help others or
only follow their own interests?”.
30Recall that the question was “Would you say that most of the time you try to help others or only
follow your own interests?”.
31E.g. Phase 1 dummy * period takes the value of 1 if we are in phase 1, period 1. The same variable
takes the value of 2 if we are in phase 1, period 2, and so on until phase 1, period 5. Phase 1 dummy *
period takes the value 0 if we are in phase 2.
32Both the number of accidents that occurred to others in the previous period and whether a sub-
ject was hit by an accident in the previous phase should not influence investment behavior since
accidents occur independently. However, it is well-known that people fall prey to fallacies when
faced with a random sequence of events. The two fallacies that may apply here are the gambler’s
fallacy and the hot hand fallacy. Given a fair coin, after a sequence of heads, people suffering from the
former would expect tails while people suffering from the latter would expect heads (see, e.g., Slovic,
2000). For our experiment this would mean respectively that a person who was hit by an accident in
phase 1, would not expect to be hit in phase 2 or indeed expect to be hit again in phase 2.
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peatedly, decisions made by the same individual are correlated. Individual-specific
random effects correct for this. The significant coefficients are marked with stars.
We use a Wald post-estimation test to pairwise compare significant coefficients. If
coefficients are different given this post-estimation test, we can conclude that the
variable with the larger coefficient has a larger effect.
While regressions “I” make use of the whole data set, regressions “II” use only data
from phase 2. The purpose of regressions IIa, and IIb is to check whether having
experienced an accident in phase 1 affects behavior in phase 2. Table 5 shows this is
not the case.
The following results hold for all regressions. All variables related to learning are
insignificant. Among the variables that deal with individual characteristics, risk at-
titude is always negatively correlated with investment behavior, meaning that inde-
pendently from the treatment, the more risk loving an individual is, the less likely
she is to invest in safety. Furthermore, the probability to invest in safety decreases
with the individual’s perception of others being selfish. Whether an individual con-
siders herself selfish or not does not influence behavior. Among the treatment vari-
ables, subjects are not sensitive to the size of the harm caused to third parties (High
damage dummy is not significant). In regressions Ia, Ib and IIa, IIb, investment in
safety is more likely under both SL and Ne than under NoL.33
Regression Ic differs from Ia and Ib in only one variable: Me–selfish * NoL dummy,
which is significant, meaning that the more selfish an individual rated herself, the
less likely she was to invest in safety in treatments NoL. The difference in the coeffi-
cients between the NoL dummy and the liability dummies vanishes in regression Ic.
I.e., when there is a control for selfishness in treatment NoL, behavior in the absence
of liability rules does not differ from behavior in the presence of liability rules. This
means that liability rules induce the selfish subjects to invest in prevention, such
33SL vs. NoL: p = 0.03, Ne vs. NoL: p = 0.00, Wald test.
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that in the end, prosocial subjects under no liability invest in safety as much as the
pool of prosocial and selfish subjects under liability.
To sum up, risk aversion increases investment in safety, learning (from own and
others’ experience) does not change investment behavior, and the opinion about
others being selfish decreases investment in safety. Furthermore, controlling for risk
aversion, learning, and social preferences does not change our previous conclusions:
SL and Ne rules induce more investment in safety than NoL and insolvency does not
change investment behavior of subjects. Regression Ic shows that the difference
between treatments without liability and with liability is driven by the increased
investment in safety of the selfish subjects in the liability treatments.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we compare the performance of three liability rules (No Liability, Strict
Liability and Negligence) enforced against a firm that can potentially cause a disas-
ter and thereby harm third parties. We model the firm’s investment in safety as a
moral hazard variable. The predictions of our theoretical model are tested in an ex-
periment. In line with theory, Strict Liability and Negligence perform better than No
Liability: agents increase their level of care when they can be held liable for the harm
caused. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of Strict
Liability and Negligence rule. Last, for a given size of own wealth, agents do not in-
vest more when losses to third parties increase (i.e. when the insolvency problem is
more stringent). In contrast with theory that predicts zero prevention under No Lia-
bility and 100% prevention under liability (for risk neutral and risk averse subjects),
prevention rates are as high as 50% in the former and significantly below 100% in
the latter case. Investment in safety remains below 100% even when excluding risk
loving subjects from the analysis.
26
Our work can be extended in the following directions.
Most of the theoretical predictions were confirmed by a subject pool of German
undergraduates. However, the substantial level of investment that appeared under
No liability will have to be further explored. Other-regarding preferences, as subjects
caring for the well-being of third parties may be responsible for this outcome. This
conjecture would be in line with Brennan et al. (2007), who show that once the own
outcome is not at risk, subjects care for the risk borne by others. More research
will also be needed to provide explanations for the relatively low investment in
prevention in the presence of liability rules.
In our setting, the size of the harm is given, and the only way of reducing expected
losses is to reduce the probability of an accident. However, one could consider a
more general model where both the probability of an accident, and the size of the
harm can be influenced by prevention. Then, the size of the harm can be linked to
the firm’s scale of activity, and the probability of an accident can be linked to the
intensity of safety effort. From the Law and Economics literature34 we know that
Strict Liability is effective in providing incentives both for activity and probability
reduction, since the responsible firm is held liable for the entire loss whatever her
behavior was in the conduct of the operations that had led to damages. The firm
has thus incentives to use all the available means to reduce expected losses. On
the contrary, Negligence rule is only effective for probability reduction: since the
injurer is not held liable if she complied with a standard of due care, only her level
of prevention matters. Her level of activity has no influence on the Court’s decision
to hold her liable or not. Thus, it would be worth developing an experiment to test
such differences in firm’s incentives when managing potential harm to third parties.
An adequate adaptation of the present experiment could also provide empirical ar-
guments for a number of long lasting theoretical debates in the Law and Economics
34See Segerson (2002) for informal arguments and Shavell (1980) for formal ones.
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and Incentive Regulation literatures. For instance, one could test the effectiveness of
extended liability,35 and also whether the risk of an accident is better controlled with
ex-ante instruments (standard regulation implemented by agencies) or with ex-post
instruments (liability rules, enforced by Courts of Law).36
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Appendix A
Risk-aversion. Let us now assume that the firm is risk-averse and her preferences
are reflected by a CARA utility function: u(x) = 1−e
−rx
r
, where the parameter r > 0
measures the absolute risk aversion and x is a monetary payoff.
Social optimum. Prevention is socially optimal as long as:
p1u(wt − h− c) + (1− p1)u(wt − c) ≥ p0u(wt − h) + (1− p0)u(wt),
a condition that can be rewritten as:
c ≤ 1
r
∗ ln
(
1− p0 + p0erh
1− p1 + p1erh
)
. (4)
No Liability. The firm chooses to invest in prevention as long as:
p1u(wt − c) + (1− p1)u(wt − c) ≥ p0u(wt) + (1− p0)u(wt),
a condition that boils down to u(wt − c) ≥ u(wt) and that, obviously, never holds
true. Hence, the firm never invests in safety in the absence of liability.
Strict Liability. The firm chooses to invest in prevention as long as:
p1u(wt −min{h,wt} − c) + (1− p1)u(wt − c) ≥ p0u(wt −min{h,wt}) + (1− p0)u(wt),
a condition that can be rewritten as:
c ≤ 1
r
∗ ln
(
1− p0 + p0ermin{h,wt}
1− p1 + p1ermin{h,wt}
)
. (5)
Comparing (4) and (5), it is straight to see that the firm will take the socially optimal
decision if she is wealthy enough, i.e. if her wealth wt is sufficient to cover harm h.
Negligence. The firm chooses to invest in prevention as long as:
p1u(wt − c) + (1− p1)u(wt − c) ≥ p0u(wt −min{h,wt}) + (1− p0)u(wt),
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a condition that can be rewritten as:
c ≤ 1
r
∗ ln (1− p0 + p0ermin{h,wt}) . (6)
Comparing (5) and (6), we can show easily that the former is more demanding than
the latter: the firm is induced to exercise care for a larger set of parameters when
submitted to Negligence rather than Strict Liability.
Hence, the qualitative theoretical results obtained with a risk-neutral firm do not
change when moving to the risk-aversion case. In particular, for the set of pa-
rameters (wt, h, p0, p1) that characterize our experimental setting, a risk-averse firm
should behave as a risk-neutral one both under No Liability and under Negligence:
for every r > 0, she should not invest in safety in the former regime and invest in
the latter. Under Strict Liability, a risk-averse firm should invest in safety for each
r ∈ {0, 9.65}, i.e. when she is not extremely risk averse.
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Appendix B [not for publication]
Instructions – for the convenience of the referee, not for publication
Instructions Part I37
These instructions are identical to all 32 participants in the experiment.
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please turn off your
cell phones and stop communicating with other participants. Please raise your hand
if you have any question. We will come to your cubicle and answer your questions
in private.
This is the first part of the instructions. The second part will be distributed to you
after you finish the following task.
You can earn your endowment by adding up two-digit numbers for five minutes.
When you are done with one mathematical task, please click the “Continue”-button
and a new mathematic task will appear on your screen. Only paper and pencil are
allowed during Part I of the experiment.
The thirty participants who solve correctly the highest number of mathematical
tasks will earn an endowment and hence the right to participate in Part II of the
experiment. The remaining two participants will have to leave the laboratory and
will receive 3 euros each.
If you have any questions, you may now raise your hand. If everything is clear,
please click the “Continue”-button.
37Part I is identical for all treatments.
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Instructions Part II
These instructions are identical to all 30 participants in the experiment.
Decision situation
This part of the experiment consists of two phases. Each phase consists of five peri-
ods. You will have to make a decision in every period. The decision you are asked
to make is the same in each period. Phase 2 is a repetition of phase 1.
At the beginning of each phase, half of the participants will be randomly assigned to
role A. The other half will be assigned to role B. Each participant B will be randomly
paired with a participant A.
During each phase, participant A will make the decisions for the pair A-B. Partici-
pant B will be affected by A’s decisions. B will not be able to influence A’s decisions.
At the beginning of each phase, A will receive an endowment of 40 ECU. B will
receive an endowment of x ECU.38 Notice that 6 ECU = 1 EURO.
Whether you are A or B in one phase, will become clear only at the end of that phase.
During a phase, everyone will decide as if they were participant A.
Your task
In each of the five periods of every phase, the following can happen to you with a
probability of 5%:
– the phase ends;
– the participant assigned to you loses money.
Henceforth, we will call this “event”.
In every period you can pay 1 ECU to reduce the event probability from 5% to 1%.
You can only reduce your “own” event probability and this probability cannot be
38x = 30 for low damage treatments NoL-low, SL-low, and Ne-low; x = 50 for high damage treat-
ments NoL-high, SL-high, and Ne-high.
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influenced by the decisions made by other participants.
The following explanation will help you understand better the probability that the
event occurs. Imagine two urns. Urn “5-b” contains 95 white balls and 5 black balls.
Urn “1-b” contains 99 white balls and 1 black ball. The event occurs when a black
ball is drawn. When a ball is drawn it is always put back into the urn, so that the
contents of each urn is the same in each period. In each period you can choose one
of the urns. If you choose urn “5-b”, you do not have to pay anything. If you choose
urn “1-b”, you have to pay 1 ECU.
In each of the five periods of every phase you will be asked the following question:
“Would you like to reduce the probability of the event to 1%?” If you answer with
“No”, you pay nothing and you choose urn “5-b”. If you answer with “Yes”, you
pay 1 ECU and you choose urn “1-b”.
Payoffs
At the end of each phase each participant will learn what role was randomly as-
signed to her. Apart from chance, only decisions of participant A in this phase will
affect the payoff of each pair A-B. Decisions of participant B will become irrelevant.
If during the phase the event does not occur for participant A, B’s payoff will be
equal to her initial endowment of x ECU. A’s payoff will be equal to 40 ECU minus
her cost for probability reduction.
If the event occurs for participant A in period t, B will lose her initial endowment
of x ECU.
The NoL treatments read: Hence, B’s payoff will be 0 ECU. A’s payoff will be 40 ECU
minus her cost for probability reduction until period t.
The SL treatments read: B will be compensated by A up to A’s wealth in period t.
SL-low reads: Hence, B’s payoff will be 30 ECU. A’s payoff will be 40 ECU minus her
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cost for probability reduction in this phase, minus the compensation payment made
to B. Example: The event occurs in period t=5. A payed in all periods. Hence, A
has 35 ECU left at the end of the phase. B loses 30 ECU, but is compensated by A.
Payoffs: A: 40-5-30=5 ECU; B: 30 ECU.
SL-high reads: Hence, B’s payoff will be smaller or equal to 40 ECU. A’s payoff will
be 0 ECU. Example: The event occurs in period t=5. A payed in all periods. Hence,
A has 35 ECU left at the end of the phase. B loses 50 ECU, but is compensated by A.
Payoffs: A: 0 ECU; B: 35 ECU.
The Ne treatments read: A and B’s payoffs will depend on whether A paid for proba-
bility reduction in period t. If A paid in period t, B will not be compensated. Hence,
B’s payoff will be 0 ECU. A’s payoff will be 40 ECU minus the cost for probability
reduction. Example: The event occurs in period t=5. A payed in all periods. Hence,
A has 35 ECU left at the end of the phase. B loses x ECU. B does not get compensated
by A. Payoffs: A: 35 ECU; B: 0 ECU.
Ne-low reads: If A did not pay in period t, B will be fully compensated by A. There-
fore, B’s payoff will be 30 ECU. A’s payoff will be 40 ECU minus her cost for proba-
bility reduction, minus the compensation payment made to B. Example: The event
occurs in period t=5. A payed in period t=1, but not in the other periods. Hence, A
has 39 ECU left at the end of the phase. B loses 30 ECU. A has to compensate B since
A did not pay in period t=5. Payoffs: A: 39-30=9 ECU, B: 30 ECU.
Ne-high reads: If A did not pay in period t, B will be compensated by A up to A’s
wealth in period t. Therefore, B’s payoff will be smaller or equal to 40 ECU. A’s
payoff will be 0. Example: The event occurred in period 5. A payed in period 1, but
not in the other periods. Hence, A has 39 ECU left at the end of the phase. B loses 50
ECU. A has to compensate B since A did not pay in period t=5. Payoffs: A: 0 ECU ,
B: 39 ECU.
All treatments read: Phase 2 is a repetition of phase 1. At the beginning of phase
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2, new random draws of roles and pairs will be made. Therefore, they will be in-
dependent from those made at the beginning of phase 1. The final payoff of each
participant is either her payoff from phase 1 or from phase 2 converted in euros.
At the end of the experiment, one of the two phases will be selected for payment
at random (with equal probability). Additionally you will receive a show-up fee of
2,50 euros.
Feedback
At the end of each period you will learn whether the event occurred for you. If the
event did not occur, the current phase will continue with the next period. If the
event did occur, the current phase will end for you. Please stay at your place until
the phase ends for all participants.
Additional feedback will be given on the number of events that occurred to other 14
participants in the experiment. Let us call this group “your feedback group”. The
other participant in your pair does not belong to your feedback group.
Overview of the sequence of events in each phase
• Each participant is assigned to either role A or role B.
• Each B is assigned to one A.
• A receives 40 ECU and B receives x ECU as their initial endowment.
• At first, participants do not know their roles.
• All participants always make decisions as if they were A.
• After each period, participants learn whether the event occurred for them-
selves and for participants in their feedback group.
• At the end of each phase, participants learn their roles.
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• If in this phase the event did not occur for the participant who was randomly
selected as A, then A’s payoff is 40 ECU minus her cost for probability reduc-
tion. Participant B in the same pair keeps her initial endowment of x ECU.
• If in this phase the event occurred for the participant who was randomly se-
lected as A, then participant B in the same pair loses her initial endowment of
x ECU. The NoL treatments read: A’s payoff is 40 ECU minus her cost for the
event probability reduction. B’s payoff is 0. The SL treatments read: B is com-
pensated by A up to A’s wealth in the period in which the event occurred. The
Ne treatments read: Payoffs for A and B depend on whether A paid for proba-
bility reduction in the period when the event occurred.
• All treatments read: Whether an event occurred for the participant randomly
selected as B, is irrelevant for her pair A-B.
Calculator
In each period you may help yourself with the “calculator” on your screen (see
picture below). It can calculate the probability for the event to occur between the
period that you are in and the the last period of the phase. This probability de-
pends on the number of the remaining periods and on your decisions in each of the
remaining periods. Imagine tossing a coin. If you toss the coin only once, you have
a 50% chance of not getting heads. But if you toss the coin five times in a row, the
chance of never getting heads is lower than 50%. Example: You are in period t=4
and want to know the probability that the event will occur before the end of the
phase. For this purpose, you need to enter your planned decisions for periods t=4
and t=5 into the calculator. The calculator will tell you the probability for the event
to occur and the complementary probability for the event not to occur in one of the
periods t=4 or t=5.
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Round Would you like to reduce the probability?
4 Yes o o No
5 Yes o o No
Calculator for round 4
The probability that the event occurs is …%.
The probability that the event does not occur is…%.
Control questions and post-experimental questionnaire
Before Part II of the experiment starts, we will ask you to answer a few questions
which will help you better understand the instructions. Questions that you answer
wrongly will reappear on your screen until you answer them correctly.
At the end of the experiment, we will ask you to complete another short question-
naire.
If you have any questions, you may now raise your hand. If not so, please click the
“Continue”-button.
40
Appendix C [not for publication]
Risk attitude NoL-low NoL-high SL-low SL-high Ne-low Ne-high
Investment N Investment N Investment N Investment N Investment N Investment N
0 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 0.80 3 0.94 2 0.70 2
2 0.78 5 0.75 3 0.73 4 0.54 5 0.72 8 0.97 6
3 0.24 2 0.66 7 0.87 7 0.95 6 1 3 0.88 4
4 0.85 4 0.40 2 0.57 5 0.62 5 0.80 1 0.70 7
5 0.67 3 0.55 6 0.79 3 0.64 6 1 3 0.50 3
6 0.30 5 0.71 5 1 2 0.40 1 0.51 5 1 1
7 0.40 5 0.21 3 0.20 2 0.59 3 0.00 1 0.30 2
8 0.08 4 0.05 2 0.27 3 0.46 4 0.44 6 0.60 2
9 0.10 2 1 1
10 1 1 0.00 1
Table 6: Investment in safety by treatment and risk attitude
Note: Investment=Investment in safety; N=Number of subjects; Risk attitude: the higher the reported score, the lower the aversion to risk.
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